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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT : DIA Document: "National Intelligence Situation Report  
Post-Mortem"

18 October 1976

1. You requested a summary of the attached package.

2. The package includes subject DIA document; the eight SITREPS prepared during the Panmunjom crisis; and several memorandums by CIA officers who participated in the Korean Task Force. The purpose in assembling these documents in one batch seems to have been to indicate the problems which arose during the convening of the first National Intelligence Task Force. Of these, the most important appear to have been the following:

a. The State Department did not participate in the Task Force and did not release LIMDIS and EXDIS traffic to it. Therefore, the Task Force was unaware of any political negotiations which might have affected developments, and could not benefit from any INR Korean expertise.

b. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide the Task Force with military operational information, which limited the Task Force's ability to produce estimative intelligence on the consequences of planned future actions.

c. Participating agencies had their own Task Forces as well as representatives on the National Task Force. Therefore, Korean expertise was stretched too thin.

d. The physical setup was poor. Comments on this subject generally referred to overcrowding and poor communications.

e. (Suggested only by one CIA analyst.) There seemed to be some confusion over the production role of Task Force members. Were they to draft the SITREPS themselves, or serve as "funnels" for contributions prepared in their home offices?

3. No doubt there has already been some discussion on this topic, but just in case, may I suggest that there should be some further inter-Agency consideration of national SITREP management before our next crisis.

DIA review(s) completed.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 SEP 1976

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Situation Report Post-Mortem (U)

The subject report is attached for your information.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR:




1 Enclosure  
Post Mortem  
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
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

- cc:
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth
  - Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
  - Director, National Security Agency
  - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
  - Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Directorate for Operations (J-3)
  - Director, Joint Staff
  - Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
  - Assistant Director to Director of Defense Intelligence for Indications and Warning/IRA
  - Civilian Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense
  - Defense Intelligence Officer (Korea)

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POST MORTEM ON THE OPERATION OF THE  
FIRST NISR TASK FORCE

- References:
- (a) DCI Memo dated 19 August 1976, subject "Task Force on National Intelligence Situation Reports"
  - (b) Procedures for the Production of a National Intelligence Situation Report (Attachment to (NFIB-D-28.7/1)
  - (c) DCI Memo dated 7 September 1976, subject: "Task Force on National Intelligence Situation Reports".

1. On 19 August, the DCI by reference (a) established the first National Intelligence Situation Report (NISR) Task Force. Its purpose was to produce an all-source community-coordinated situation report, as outlined by reference (b), on the crisis which had developed in Korea. Considering that the nature of this crisis was preponderantly military, DIA was designated executive agent. A Task Force was quickly formed and operated around-the-clock during the peak of the crisis, then tapered off to once-daily sessions as the crisis subsided. The Task Force issued a total of eight SITREPS (copies at Enclosure (1)) between 20 and 30 August. It then halted production because the crisis had stabilized and was formally terminated by reference (c) on 7 September. This post-mortem will provide a brief chronology of the salient developments of the Task Force's experience, offer our views of its accomplishments and problems, and suggest directions that future NISR developments might take.

CHRONOLOGY

August 1976 (all times are EDT)

- 172150 - Two Americans Officers are slain in Korea DMZ Joint Security Area by North Koreans.
- 191212 - DCI Memo establishing NISR Task Force arrives NMIC. DIA designated Executive Agent.
- 191300- DIA invited State/INR, CIA, NSA, and IC Staff
- 191400 to participate in Task Force.
- 191600 - Initial meeting of participants held at NMIC.

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Attending were:

[REDACTED] OPR/SAS, CIA  
CLAS BY TK-1, EXEMPT FM GDS/EO  
11652, EXEMPT CAT PARA 5B(2),  
DECLAS ON IMPDET

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[redacted] NSA  
Mr. Robert Baraz, State/INR

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[redacted] IC Staff  
LtGen Samuel Wilson, Director, DIA

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[redacted] VP, DIA  
[redacted] DIA  
[redacted] DIA  
[redacted] DIA

Plus Other DIA Staff members.

General Wilson reported to the group that he had just discussed the matter of J-3 involvement in the NISR with members of the Operations Directorate. Gen Wilson stated that the Operations input would be limited in the preparation of the NISR for this particular incident to "after-the-fact" reports of operations. No operational plans or sets of options would be included in the NISR although these would be released to the Task Group members for their eyes only. J-3 reservations were basically those which had been outlined in a 1 June memo from DIA to [redacted] IC Staff, on this subject. A copy of that memo is at Enclosure (2).

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191800- The NISR Task Force convened in the working space assigned it by DIA. The room was equipped with a grey phone, autosevocom, a secure intercom to the Alert Center and General [redacted] office, plus a number of black, non-secure phone lines. It provided adequate working space and was located about 100 feet from the NMIC Alert Center. A printer was activated to relay message traffic from the JCS Communications Center to the Task Group via the DIA Alert Center.

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191800- Task Group considered administrative details and  
192100 coordination procedures. NSA rep stated he would coordinate for his agency. CIA rep stated he would LDX drafts to Langley Headquarters for coordination whenever possible. State/INR would coordinate after normal duty hours through their Ops Center, if an analyst was available. Otherwise, no coordination would be provided -- basically the same arrangement they operate with respect to publication of the National Intelligence Daily.

192200- State Ops Center, WHSR and CIA Ops Center called to assure they had phone numbers of Task Force. Memo was issued with appropriate phone numbers and names of task groups personnel.

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192130 - State Rep secures.

192200 - Task Group commences writing first report.

200130 - Coordination copies sent to CIA, State/INR, CIA coordinates; no reply from State.

25X1A 200200 - Gen [ ] releases first SitRep.

200230 - Advance copies LDXed to WHSR, CIA, State/INR and NSA. CIA will publish SITREP verbatim in NID.

200430 - Hard copies printed and distributed.

200600 - Checked with WHSR, CIA Rep in NMCC, State Ops  
200630 Center to assure hard copies had arrived. WHSR and CIA had received. State had not received but indicated the LDX copy would suffice for their purposes.

200800 - Relief personnel begin arriving:

25X1A DIA: [ ] for [ ] 25X1A  
25X1A [ ] for [ ] 25X1A

25X1A CIA: [ ] for [ ] 25X1A

25X1A NSA: [ ] for [ ] 25X1A

State/INR: No representation

25X1A IC Staff: [ ] for [ ] 25X1A

NOTE: These were the major Task Force participants throughout the operation. Reliefs were handled individually by each agency, "twelve-on and twelve-off" initially, and thereafter oriented to accommodate the production schedule.

200925 - NIO for Korea calls for Ops data for DCI.

25X1A 200955 - CIA calls. DCI wants info on road blocks. Mr. [ ] put in touch with [ ] DIA Rep 25X1A  
on the NMCC Crisis Action Team.

201000 - Obtained Air Force deployment data from Air Force Ops.

25X1A 201000 - [ ] arrives from CIA. 25X1

[ ]

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- 201017 - Jim Fazio, WHSR, calls. Very interested in Soviet/PRC reaction. Provided latest available information.
- 201025 - Mr. Ralph Searret, State/INR, advises that Mr. Richmond Finch would report to the Task Force as State Rep.
- 201100 - No State message traffic -- EXDIS, LIMDIS -- being received.
- 25X1A 201100 - General [ ] asks for Task Force status report. Told that Ops data flow from J-3 was lacking.
- 25X1A General [ ] confers with Crisis Action Team in NMCC. Cooperation improves.
- 201125 - Mr. Robert Baraz, State/INR, advises no analysts will be provided to Task Force, nor will input be made to SITREP. Stated that he had not received draft of initial SITREP.
- 201240 - Dick Finch State/INR, advises by phone that he is at NMCC - not NMIC -- and will remain there to work with NMCC Crisis Action Team, vice original understanding that he would work with NISR Task Group.
- 201400 - Second SITREP published.
- 201500 - Designated a "runner" to keep NISR Task Force advised of information being received by DIA Task Force located about 100 feet away.
- 201500- Volume of information flow is high. Readily apparent
- 201800 to all that counterpart Task Forces at CIA, State, and DIA are receiving data more quickly and more reliably than NISR Task Force.
- 201800 - UNC work party tree cutting operation underway.
- 201951 - CINCUNC reports operation complete.
- 25X1A 202100 - Gen [ ] advises that a SITREP should be published as of 202400, after which the Task Force can remain on-call until 0100 Monday morning. Meantime, DIA 25X1A would maintain an intelligence watch.
- 202400 - The third SITREP is released by [ ] DIO 25X1 for Korea.

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NOTE: Task Force operations after this point were largely routine.

Subsequent SITREPS were published at 0500 23 Aug, 1200 24 Aug, 0900 25 Aug, 1000 26 Aug, and 1200 27 Aug. From publication of the last SITREP on through to its formal termination on 9 September - as well as all previous times when the group was not in session -- participating agencies were relied on to maintain an intelligence watch.

### Accomplishments

3. The first NISR Task Force achieved several milestones.

- It "broke the ice", proved that a NISR is possible and that a community Task Group can work harmoniously and effectively under crisis conditions.

- It established the precedent that future crises will be accompanied by a NISR.

- It managed to involve the military operators and State Department -- even though the depth of their involvement was not what we had hoped.

- We gained valuable experience with procedural and operating aspects of a NISR task group.

- We produced a SITREP which came closer to providing that desired "BIG PICTURE" than anything we have done to date. It was a high quality product, well received by its readership.

### Problems

4. Predictably, the Task Force experienced its share of problems, as evidenced in the chronology above:

- The Task Group was not well situated in the pattern of information flow. Data was somewhat tardy, occasionally missing altogether. It was readily apparent that the NISR Task Group was an unfamiliar node in the communication system.

- The State Department did not participate to the extent we would have liked. No state representatives served on the Task Group, other than briefly during the initial meeting. They mounted no effort to feed information to the Task Group. Despite repeated requests, EXDIS and LIMDIS traffic was not disseminated to the Task Force. Indeed, on one occasion, they

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refused to allow the Task Force to include information in the SITREP which had already been released to the press. No single point-of-contact was made consistently available for liaison with the Task Force. Coordination of the draft SITREPs with State was difficult because there was usually no specialist available to supply the coordination, especially after the actual tree-cutting operation was performed and State's own Task Force was terminated.

- Involvement of military operators was limited. No operators were assigned to serve with the Task Group. Ground rules of the Task Group excluded publication of military plans or options being considered. Perhaps even more important, the information which had originally been expected of the operators, i.e., eyes only planning data for the Task Group but not for publication, never materialized. Getting information from the NMCC Crisis Action Team was physically difficult. The working level officers had obviously not been briefed on the existence of the NISR Task Group or its function, and therefore felt no obligation to provide it data. We should note that improvement was made, however; during the latter few days of the operation, J-3 assigned points of contact to work with the Task Force. These officers were cooperative and helpful. ✓

#### Recommendations

5. Many of the problems encountered by the Task Force were due to the "first-time" aspects of the operation. These can be resolved by applying certain procedural adjustments, such as:

- Using NOIWON to notify participating agencies that a Task Force is being convened, who the executive agent is, and what modalities have been arranged. This should save some time and adrenalin. Indeed, it raises the whole question of what applications could be made of certain systems like CONTEXT or NOIAN.

- Adjusting our respective agency crisis management plans to accommodate the NIRS Task Force. Adequate physical spaces, communications and clerical support, maps, photos, badges, pencils, etc., could all be arranged now rather than the moment of crisis when much more important considerations demand attention. DIA, for example, will modify its modernization plans to accommodate the kind of task force requirements that became evident during this first episode. 25X1



6. Certain of these matters, however, will depend on the answers to more fundamental questions, e.g., what are the bounds of the NISR Task Force's analytical responsibilities? Certain elements expected it to perform original analysis but that appears neither desirable or possible. There are too few people involved to handle the torrent of information that a crisis usually generates. Moreover, each of the Community members maintained their own Task Force, so it would be duplicative to do what these elements are already in operation to do. I perceive the NISR Task Force as a synthesizing group, drawing on and coordinating the work of its member agencies. Some clarification of mission -- regardless of what it is -- should be made in the basic documentation covering operation of the NISR Task Group. That is key to arranging the proper support for the Task Group.

7. Certainly the most fundamental problem that the first NISR Task Group experienced had to do with the role accorded the State Department and the Joint Staff. As we had anticipated during the formulation stages of the NISR, both State and the Joint Staff proved extremely reluctant to release information into intelligence channels which they regard as their legitimate preserve -- information which heretofore has been available only to the President or his designated representatives. Their concerns are deeply rooted in the institutional nature of each organization and the arguments they present for not sharing such "privileged" information are compelling indeed. In light of that, I perceive there are two basic courses of action open to us;

a. We can accept the essential bounds imposed on the scope of the NISR by the military operations and Department of State during this first NISR episode, i.e., we confine it to intelligence and after-the-fact operational and diplomatic reporting, or

b. We stand by our original concept of producing a single SITREP which will "provide its readership with all intelligence and operational information bearing on the problem at hand, including sensitive intelligence information and information concerning US diplomatic initiatives and military activities." (Quoted from Reference (c), "Procedures for the Production of a National Intelligence Situation Report".) To effect this course of action, an NSC directive is necessary.

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2 Enclosures

See page 8

DIRECTOR, NISR TASK FORCE ON KOREA

Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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20 AUGUST 1976  
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# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT


Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the  
Director of Central Intelligence with the  
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.

## KOREA

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#1-76

1400 0200 EDT

20 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

### K O R E A

#### Summary

Military forces in Korea are on alert following the incident at Panmunjom in which two US servicemen were killed. North Korean military units were detected assuming an advanced state of readiness as early as one hour after US and South Korean forces were placed in DEFCON 3. Politically, Pyongyang appears to be acting with caution while seeking to portray itself as the victim of aggressive US designs. Little international reaction has been noted, and communist countries appear to be awaiting US response.

#### Military Situation

Both the North Korean armed forces and the US forces in Korea went to increased alert status on 19 August following the incident at Panmunjom the previous day in which two US officers were killed. US forces were placed on DEFCON 3 at 182130EDT. [redacted] Some seven

hours later, Pyongyang publicly announced that all militarized units had been ordered by the North Korean Supreme Command to "enter a state of combat readiness." The radio broadcast cited the August 18 encounter and the increased "combat readiness" posture of the US as provocations.

Prior to the August 18 incident, North Korean military activity appeared to be following seasonal norms. All services engaged in routine training and operations during the past several months.

Since the alert, there has been no indication of major ground force movement. [redacted]

[redacted] The 426,000-man North Korean Army (NKA) remains concentrated with one tank and some 14 infantry divisions along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Much of Pyongyang's armor and artillery assets are also located in the forward area. These forces are backed by a variety of other combat units situated along both coasts. Pyongyang also maintains sizable commando-type forces capable of conducting specialized missions south of the DMZ. [redacted]

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Naval units apparently are also on alert, but no unusual unit movements have been observed. [REDACTED]

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While the 1.8 million paramilitary force has been alerted according to Pyongyang's announcement, [REDACTED]

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At this time it appears that Pyongyang's alert is in reaction to a similar US move and apparent concern that the US might retaliate for the August 18 incident. Although highly unusual, the alert has been overt and well-publicized, enforcing the conclusion that it is a reactive measure. There are as yet no suggestions that Pyongyang plans to conduct a preemptive strike against the south or is preparing for a full-scale invasion. Some repositioning and reinforcement of forward ground units and increased air and naval preparations against air attack can be expected if the alert continues.

On August 19, the US Department of Defense announced that one squadron of F-4 fighters and a squadron of F-111 attack aircraft has been ordered to reinforce US forces in Korea. These forces will join the some 42,000 US forces already in Korea, including an infantry and air division. South Korean forces have also been placed on DEFCON 3.

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### Political Situation

Following its alert announcement yesterday, Pyongyang appears to be acting with caution while seeking to portray itself as the victim of aggressive US designs.

The North Koreans agreed to attend the August 19 meeting of the Military Armistice Committee and, while engaging in their customary polemics, did not disrupt the proceedings. In a move to document their version of the violent incident on August 18, the communists produced photographs purporting to prove that some of their men had been injured by UN Command personnel. Pyongyang has remained silent on the slaying of the two US officers, acknowledging only that there were injuries on both sides.

In public statements on the incident Pyongyang has sought mainly to call attention to heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. However, there have been no threats--or any of President Kim Il-song's bombastic pledges--to respond with a "revolutionary war" designed to drive the US from Korea.

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Pyongyang's unprecedented public announcement of its military alert is essentially a political move designed in part to underscore its contention that the presence of US forces in Korea is endangering stability on the peninsula. The North Korean report contended that Pyongyang's alert was in reaction to the US alert.

### International Considerations

South Korea's ruling and opposition parties denounced the incident yesterday. The South Korean press and Korean contacts [redacted] in Seoul seem concerned that the US may not react with an adequate show of strength. President Pak, however, has reacted calmly. In a recent conversation with a senior US officer, he noted that the situation was sufficiently grave to warrant more than a verbal protest, but recommended against the use of force.

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We have not detected any unusual movement by units of the Soviet Pacific Fleet toward Korean waters. [redacted]

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There has been no Soviet press reaction to the incident of August 18, and none is likely until the extent of US response is known. The Soviets, in any case will probably give verbal support to the North Koreans while trying to avoid any direct involvement.

Peking has not yet commented on the incident at Panmunjom. The direct involvement of US troops in the August 18 incident may have led Peking to proceed more cautiously than usual. In early August, for example, only a day after North and South Korean troops exchanged fire across the DMZ, the Chinese replayed Pyongyang's official statement.

A US letter detailing recent North Korean aggressive actions was delivered to the President of the UN Security Council on August 19 and will be circulated today to member nations.

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Release Authority

[redacted]  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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

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NISR 2-76

20 AUGUST 1976

1400 HOURS

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# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the  
Director of Central Intelligence with the  
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.


## KOREA

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#2-76  
1400 EDT  
20 August 1976

# National Intelligence Situation Report

## K O R E A

### Summary

There has been little change in the situation in Korea over the past 12 hours and there have been no new North Korean provocations. North Korean forces remain in a high state of readiness and are expected to maintain this posture in anticipation of a possible US-Republic of Korea military response to the Joint Security Area incident. Pyongyang continues to display caution in the political arena and international reaction has been along expected lines.

### Military Situation

North Korean military units continue their high state of alert. Since the issuance of the 19 August "combat readiness" directive by the North Korean Supreme Command, ground units are on "standby" readiness throughout the country. Increased truck traffic has been observed in the forward area, but such activity can be expected in view of the increased alert posture.

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The Provincial Party is not a high-level directive authority; are probably an indication of activity country-wide and in keeping with readiness developments already noted.

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The tactical air standdown continues for the second day with some fighters and bombers maintaining strip alert. According to a Pyongyang radio broadcast, today is North Korean Air Force day, and this force is on "combat alert."

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and is a further indication of North Korea's upgraded defense posture. Weather conditions over North Korea remain poor and are expected to remain so for the next two to three days.

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Renewed calls for war preparations continue. The most recent occurred today when Pyongyang issued a statement decrying the movement of US aircraft to South Korea. Thus far, the US has deployed a total of 18 F-4s and four RF-4s to Osan and 20 F-111s to Taegu. The aircraft arrived at the bases at 190546 EDT and 200455 EDT August, respectively.

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#### International Considerations

The South Korean Government has not formulated any plans to respond to the incident, but will monitor the situation as it develops. Blue House officials believe the North Koreans made several strategic mistakes that can be used to good advantage. Media interviews with the man on the street in Seoul show that they perceive a renewed threat from the North and people have united solidly behind the Pak government.

Peking has not commented directly on the military measures taken by both sides, but the commentary stopped short, however, of promising Pyongyang all-out support. Comments from several other communist capitals have sided with North Korea. A Hong Kong newspaper has provided the first Chinese reaction. It predictably accused the US and South Korea of provoking the incident to provide a pretext for US failure to implement the North Korean-backed UN General Assembly Resolution on Korea.

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The nonaligned summit passed the North Korean resolution condemning "imperialist maneuvers for aggression against Korea." However, it was not a complete triumph for the North as at least 15 nations voiced objections to the resolution.

There still has been no Soviet press comment on the situation, and no unusual Soviet or Chinese military moves have been detected.

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A Singapore Straits Times editorial stated that both sides are always spoiling for a fight but notes that the stern words of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger should be backed up by credible action to deter further unwarranted provocation. The editorial cautioned, however, against US/Republic of Korea rash countermeasures.

### Political Situation

No Peoples Republic of China representatives attended the 19 August Military Armistice Compound meeting, and surprisingly, there were no North Korean guards with the North Korean delegation at the meeting. The meeting of the South-North Red Cross Societies was held at Panmunjom on the 20th, and again neither North Korean guards nor reporters were present. In summary, Pyongyang is still acting cautiously while seeking to portray itself as the victim of US aggression.

### Assessment

Although our evidence is limited, we believe that Pyongyang has continued to follow a course that contains much bluster but is essentially defensive. Their options, however, remain open and they could act at any time.

equival [redacted]

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[redacted] We have still seen no signs that North Korea plans either a preemptive strike against the South or a full-scale invasion. In addition, we note that North Korea propaganda still eschews rhetoric that would indicate Pyongyang wants war. Even in their limited contacts with South Koreans -- at the 18th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Societies at Panmunjom on 20 August -- North Korean representatives played relatively low-key roles. We would, of course, expect recent US military deployments to have had at least some dampening effect on North Korean propensities toward provocations as would the restraint so far shown by the USSR and China. In summary, North Korea's advanced military alert, which has spread to the small-unit level, still appears to us to be primarily precautionary rather than in expectation of major military action.

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[redacted]  
Release Authority

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Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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20 AUGUST 1976

NOFORN

1400-2400 Hours



# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the  
Director of Central Intelligence with the  
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**KOREA**

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#3-76  
2400 EDT  
20 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

### K O R E A

#### Summary

A UN Command task force has cut down the tree in the Joint Security Area, the focus of the August 18 incident involving the killing of two US officers. North Korean personnel made no attempt to stop the tree removal, although they lodged a written protest over the operation. No significant North Korean military reactions have been noted.

#### Military Situation

At 1800 EDT August 20, a UN Command work party of 38 US and 60 South Korean personnel entered the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom to cut down the tree at the site where North Korean personnel had two days earlier killed two US officers. Some 20 North Korean soldiers were in the immediate area but did not interfere. Another 50 or so watched from across a nearby bridge. The work party cut down the tree and removed two illegal North Korean barriers. The operation was completed, and the work party cleared the Joint Security Area in about one and one-half hours. No US backup forces had to be committed.

As the operation concluded, the North Koreans passed a message through Military Armistice Commission channels demanding that the "reckless provocation" cease and that all troops be removed from the area. The UN Command responded that the tree had been cut down and the work party had left the scene. Subsequently, the North Koreans requested a meeting of the two principal Military Armistice Commission members.

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This meeting, which convened at 2245 EDT August 20, was the scene of a conciliatory North Korean statement to the effect that the August 18 incident was "regrettable." The North Korean spokesmen promised that his side "will never provoke first."

The North Korean armed forces remain in a high state of readiness, but no significant military movements have been detected. The standdown of fighters and bombers has entered its third day, but international civil flights continue. A number of aircraft remain on strip alert. A North Korean press article commenting on Air Force Day, August 20, stated that the air force was in "full combat posture."

North Korean air defense units tracked US F-4 fighters and B-52 bombers operating over South Korea. At 1729 EDT, tracking of incoming B-52s was noted, and it continued intermittently throughout the session. There has been no further evidence of any North Korean military reaction to the movement of US forces to South Korea, nor has there been any military reaction to the tree cutting operation.

About two hours after the removal of the tree, a helicopter carrying the task force commander was hit by small-arms fire while airborne about 1,000 meters east of Panmunjom. One round struck the tail rotor pylon; there were no casualties, and no fire was exchanged. We do not consider this significant or even necessarily related to the task force operation. Such incidents happen routinely when the North Koreans believe our aircraft approach too close to their positions.

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US Collection Operations

US intelligence collection operations targeted against North Korea for the next several days are designed to accomplish these objectives:

- Surveillance of the DMZ to detect and determine the nature of any activities in violation of the protocols;
- Timely warning of any intent by North Korea to initiate limited or full-scale hostilities; and
- An understanding of military and political developments in Pyongyang, Peking, and other centers of diplomatic activities.

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Assessment

The UN Command actions in the wake of the August 18 North Korean attack on US and ROK personnel in the Joint Security Area, as well as the rapidity of the various US military deployments to the Korean area, should give Pyongyang pause. Our response, for example, must have convinced North Korea that it risked

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an unwarranted military escalation. It would thus be reasonable for the North Koreans to reassess briefly both their position and that of their adversaries.

Pyongyang's basic policy stance will, however, probably remain unchanged. It is committed to finding a way to rupture US-ROK security ties and will put much effort into portraying the US as the prime instigator of instability on the Korean Peninsula. Pongyang doubtless perceives that it will have a number of good opportunities toward this end in coming months, e.g., during the US election campaign and the UN debate on Korea this fall. We would expect, therefore, that North Korea will continue to stage provocations from which it expects to extract political and diplomatic mileage. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
Release Authority

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*for* [REDACTED]  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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NISR 4-76

23 AUGUST 1976

0500 Hours



# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

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4-76  
0500 EDT  
23 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

### K O R E A

#### Summary

There has been no North Korean military reaction to the tree-cutting operation and, although still on alert, there are signs that the armed forces are returning to a more normal status.

A private message to the US from Kim Il-sung indicates his desire to defuse the current crisis. South Korean leaders appear satisfied with the demonstration of US firmness, but want Washington to maintain pressure on the North, including retention in the region of the US military force augmentation.

At this point, the North Koreans may feel that they have achieved some political gains by dramatizing to the world the issue of the US military presence in Korea. However, this has been at the price of a public backdown in the confrontation. In this regard, Pyongyang will probably calculate with increased care before undertaking any new military provocations.

#### Military Situation

There has been no North Korean military reaction to the tree-clearing operation. The North Korean armed forces remain on increased readiness posture, but there are signs that the regular forces are returning to a more normal status. The air force has resumed limited flight activity and [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, an August 22 press article stated that armed forces "are in full combat readiness." The alert publicly announced by Pyongyang on August 19 will probably remain in effect until North Korea is convinced that the threat of military action by the US and its South Korean ally has abated. For propaganda purposes, Pyongyang may continue to maintain a "paper alert" long after the armed forces have resumed routine operations. We still see no indication in North Korean activity of hostile intent, nor have we detected any significant military movement. No Soviet or PRC military reaction to the situation has been noted.

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The air force standdown which began on August 18 ended on August 22.

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Fighters were again noted active on the 23rd.

Both North Korean and PRC radars tracked US B-52s and accompanying fighters on their second and third days of training flights over South Korea.

Since the resumption of North Korean flight activity,

Thus, the air force appears to be easing its alert posture.

Although naval units continue overall naval activity appears to have returned to normal.

The North Korean ground forces remain on increased alert, but routine training activity has been observed by units in at least one of the forward Army Corps. Also, in a domestic broadcast, Pyongyang urged North Korean military personnel to "make full preparations to cope with war." At the same time the broadcast talked of pushing ahead with socialist construction and intensifying the economic drive. These sentiments suggest that Pyongyang does not wish to overly disrupt the economy during this tense period.

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Allied Forces remain on increased alert. Joint Security Area operations have assumed a more normal posture, and the incremental phasedown of the tree-cutting operation is underway. B-52s, accompanied by US and South Korean fighters, conducted training missions over the South Korean landmass on August 21, 22 and 23. The F-4 and F-111 aircraft, which deployed to South Korea on August 19 and 20, respectively, remain there. The carrier MIDWAY task group arrived on station in the vicinity of the southern approaches to the Korea Strait at 1500 EDT on August 22.

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#### Political Situation

The most significant North Korean political response since the August 21 tree-clearing operation is the delivery, three and a half hours later at Panmunjom, of a private message from President Kim Il-sung to the United Nations Commander. The message was conveyed orally and privately by the senior North Korean representative on the Military Armistice Commission to his UN Command counterpart.

This is the official English record of their conversation:

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**BEGIN QUOTE:**

KPA First Statement: I have been instructed by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army to convey his message to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command side. Quotation: It was a good thing that no big incident occurred at Panmunjom for a long period. However, it is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, this time. An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in the future. For this purpose both sides should make efforts. We urge your side to prevent the provocation. Our side will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs. This is our consistent stand. End of Quotation. I hope that you convey this message to your side's Commander-in-Chief at the quickest possible time.

UNC First Statement: The Supreme Commander KPA message to Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, will be delivered by me to CINCUNC in accordance with your desires.

KPA Second Statement: I have one thing to add. This morning your side again committed provocation by bringing hundreds of completely armed personnel in the JSA without any advance notification. Such incidents on your part might cause such one that occurred on the 18th. I strongly demand that your side commit no such provocations.

UNC Second Statement: May I have a copy of the Supreme Commander's message to CINCUNC?

KPA Third Statement: At present I have no copy. I now await your reply to my last statement.

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UNC Third Statement: Today I met with you at your request only to receive your Supreme Commander's message to CINCUNC. I have nothing further to discuss at this time. If you have any other subjects to discuss, we may do so at a future meeting.

KPA Fourth Statement: I would like to state once more clearly, that the provocation which you committed this morning is a serious one which might cause a serious consequences. Therefore, I hope that you seriously consider this and take responsible measures so that such provocations may not recur. I propose to conclude our meeting.

UNC Fourth Statement: I agree to your proposal to conclude the meeting at this time.

END QUOTE.

Kim Il-sung's message, terming the events of August 18 (when two US officers were killed) "regretful" is an effort on his part to defuse the current military tension. Kim's failure to provide a written statement may be an attempt to avoid losing prestige among Koreans by appearing to have backed down in the confrontation. In their press and radio commentaries, for example, the North Koreans are expressing themselves in characteristically vigorous language, though with notable restraint in the use of threats.

South Korean leaders have expressed general satisfaction with the firmness of the US military response to the August 18 killings. There is particular appreciation of the US effort to coordinate plans with ROK authorities and to involve ROK forces in a meaningful way.

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On the other hand, top South Korean leaders have formally expressed to US officials in Seoul a concern that the US might be tempted, in light of Kim Il-sung's admittedly conciliatory statement, to let the North off too easily.

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The South Koreans advocated maintenance of the augmented US force in South Korea until such objectives are achieved.

The South Koreans are disturbed by other implications of the Kim Il-sung message, including the absence of any South Korean officer at the August 21 meeting. Seoul has persistent concerns about anything resembling direct US-North Korean negotiations on political matters.

#### Assessment

At this point in the current crisis, the North Koreans may see more gains than losses for themselves. They have succeeded in dramatizing to the world the issue of the UN military presence in Korea. They are setting the stage for an intensified diplomatic campaign to win support for their anti-US resolution at the fall session of the UN General Assembly. Pyongyang may also feel that it has opened up new possibilities for direct talks with the US on such quasi-political matters as improved security arrangements at Panmunjom.

On the other hand, the North Koreans have been compelled to back down publicly on the matter at issue, apparently intimidated by the military forces so rapidly brought to bear. Nor can Pyongyang be happy with the lack of international enthusiasm for its cause during the recent crisis. The USSR and China offered only feeble replays of North Korean statements and no significant support. Other communist and left-leaning nations with few exceptions, offered only brief and bland commentary.

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The outlook at this point is for a continuation of North Korea's diplomatic offensive against the US military presence in Korea. It is likely, however, that Pyongyang will calculate with increased care before undertaking any new military provocations against US forces in the region

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Release Authority

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Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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
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NISR 5-76

24 AUGUST 1976


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
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## KOREA



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5-76  
1200 EDT  
24 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

### K O R E A

#### Summary

No hostile North Korean military reactions have been noted to the August 21 tree cutting operation. North Korean military forces generally remain in a high state of readiness, but additional elements are moving toward a more routine posture. The Military Armistice Commission is scheduled to meet August 25 at 1600 Korea time (0300 EDT).

#### Military Situation

Few indications of heightened North Korean military activity have been noted since the last Situation Report.

Generally, however, North Korean units are returning to more routine activity. Training, inspections, and routine patrols are being resumed by various elements.

US intelligence collection operations continue at an advanced pace.

#### Political Situation

The UN Command called for a full Military Armistice Commission meeting today to seek assurances that the safety of UN Command personnel in the Joint Security Area will be preserved and that the freedom of activity guaranteed to both sides will be respected. The North Koreans, in a routine move, proposed that the meeting be deferred until August 25 at 0300 EDT. Commander in Chief, UN Command, has accepted that proposal.

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No significant international reaction to the Korean situation has been noted. Most foreign media coverage remains factual and low key. Neither Peking nor Moscow has issued more than pro forma statements. [REDACTED]

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Release Authority

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Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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

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NISR 6-76

25 AUGUST 1976

0900 Hours



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## KOREA




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6-76

0900 EDT

25 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

## K O R E A

Summary

North Korean Armed Forces generally remain in an advanced alert posture. No major elements have redeployed, however, and some units within all three services have shown signs of returning to more normal activity. North Korean actions at the Military Armistice Commission meeting this morning were generally restrained and indicated an interest in pursuing discussion of the issue of personnel security in the Joint Security Area. In the near term, North Korea will probably continue to attempt to defuse the current crisis.

Military Situation

North Korean Armed Forces generally remain in an advanced readiness condition. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] North Korean radars are tracking the US B52s flying over South Korea. Occasional [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] continue to be noted in North Korean Army activity. There are, however, signs that the alert is being relaxed. Units of all services are resuming more normal operations.

[REDACTED] elements of [REDACTED]

No significant military deployments have been detected, and few tactical movements have been noted in the DMZ area. North Korean naval activity appears to be normal with only sporadic [REDACTED] Units are continuing to conduct routine duty patrols and exercises with no unusual deployments noted on either coast.

UN Command forces remain in DEFCON 3. The additional two tactical fighter squadrons--the F-4 squadron at Kunsan and the F-111 squadron at Taegu--deployed to Korea in the wake of the August 18 incident remain there. The MIDWAY and her accompanying surface combatants are operating in the Korean Strait, and B-52D training sorties continue to overfly South Korea at a rate of one cell of three aircraft per day. US intelligence collection operations also continue at an advanced pace.

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Political Situation

At the scheduled meeting of the Military Armistice Commission this morning (1600 Korean time on 25 August), the North Koreans proposed complete separation of the security personnel of the two sides as one way to avoid further violent incidents in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. Specifically, they suggested that guard posts of the two parties be set up only on their respective sides of the military demarcation line as it runs through the Joint Security Area. North Korean press and radio commentary suggested that separation be enforced even in the conference hall at the site. The commentaries argued in restrained language for the "reasonableness" of the Northern proposal which, in effect, substantially modifies the agreed 1953 ground rules of the Military Armistice Commission.

At the same time, however, the North Korean senior representative at the Military Armistice Commission meeting evaded direct comment on the UN representative's demand that Pyongyang ensure the safety of UN Command personnel at Panmunjom and punish those responsible for the 18 August murders.

Meanwhile, a South Korean news service has characterized the North Korean posture these past few days as a virtual "capitulation."

Assessment

Our best judgment is that the North Korean Armed Forces are not preparing any major military response to US actions. Since the August 18 incident at Panmunjom, North Korean actions have been primarily cautious and defensive in nature and have not reflected intent to conduct open hostilities. The military alert, publicly announced on August 19, will likely remain in effect until Pyongyang is convinced that the threat of military action by the US and its South Korean ally has been reduced. In the near term, North Korea will probably continue to attempt to defuse the current crisis. In the longer term, however, Pyongyang will continue to try to

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focus world attention on the US presence in Korea, emphasizing claims that the US is responsible for tensions on the peninsula. In this respect, we would expect continuing harassment, propaganda, and diplomatic initiative. We would, however, expect North Korea to avoid actions that could lead to new confrontations with US forces. [REDACTED]

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26 AUGUST 1976


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## **KOREA**



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7-76  
1000 EDT  
26 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

## K O R E A

Summary

The North Korean Armed Forces remain in an increased readiness posture. Their gradual return to more routine activity continues, however, and no major force movements have been observed. The DMZ remains quiet.

Yesterday's North Korean proposal at Panmunjom is designed primarily to induce the US to return as soon as possible to a normal military posture in the peninsula.

Military Situation

North Korean military aircraft were unseasonably active on the 25th, probably a result of clearing weather over North Korea and a resumption of routine training operations.

and air surveillance facilities continued to track US B-52 training missions over South Korea.

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Naval units engaged in patrol operations and maneuvering exercises on August 25. Friendly ground-based radars showed an increase in naval activity in the southwest, possibly related to supply and personnel movements.

Ground forces are maintaining their increased alert posture although evidence of more normal activities has been noted. No significant unit movement or force concentrations in the forward area have been detected.

No change has occurred in the posture of friendly forces since the last situation report. The UN Command continues in DEFCON 3. The MIDWAY task group is conducting training

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and defensive flight operations in the Korea Strait, and the two recently deployed tactical fighter squadrons remain on alert. B-52 sorties have been scheduled over South Korea thru August 29, and US intelligence collection operations in the area continue at an advanced pace.

### Political Situation

Yesterday's proposal by Pyongyang to separate North Korean and UN Command personnel in the Joint Security Area is designed primarily to ease current tensions and induce the US to return as soon as possible to a normal military posture in the peninsula. To advertise the proposal, spokesmen in Pyongyang have presented the North Korean case, in relatively moderate terms, at a briefing for foreign news media. For their more avid supporters abroad, North Korean press and radio are purveying shrill denunciations of the US military presence in Korea, with emphasis on current B-52 and carrier task force operations.

Soviet comments [ ] make it clear that Moscow sees the August 18 killings as a deliberate provocation by Kim Il-sung, done in pursuance of his campaign to win Third World political support. The Soviets do not believe that Kim anticipated any sort of military crisis, however. Chinese views, [ ] similarly emphasize a belief that the current crisis will not lead to war. 25X1

Some South Korean military leaders feel that US reactions of the past week have been too restrained. President Pak, however, believes that South Korea had to work within the UN Command structure and abide by US decisions, and so informed his military colleagues. [ ] 25X1A  
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[ ]  
Release Authority

for [ ]  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production 25X1A

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
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NISR 8-76

27 AUGUST 1976

1100 Hours



# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

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## KOREA

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8-76

1100

27 August 1976

## National Intelligence Situation Report

## K O R E A

Summary

Both North Korean and UN Command forces remain on alert, but no indications of hostile actions are evident and the situation seems stable.

Military Situation

North Korean military activity is generally following normal patterns. Little flight activity was noted on the 27th, probably because of worsening weather conditions.

[REDACTED] North Korean naval and ground force operations are also largely routine, although indications of increased readiness conditions are occasionally noted.

No change in US force dispositions has occurred since the last SITREP. North Korean air surveillance facilities continue to monitor US B-52 training missions over South Korea, and Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft are monitoring the MIDWAY task group.

Political Situation

There will be a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on Saturday at 1700 Korean time (Saturday at 0400 EDT) at which the UN Command will respond to North Korea's proposal to separate security personnel of the two sides in the Joint Security Area.

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At the UN in New York, on Tuesday, August 24, officials of the North Korean mission privately indicated that Pyongyang will continue to press for adoption by the General Assembly this fall of a tough resolution against the presence of US forces in South Korea. In Peking this week, Chinese officials reaffirmed PRC support for the North Korean resolution.

[REDACTED]

NOTE: Daily National Intelligence Situation Reports on Korea will cease with this report. A watch of the situation will be maintained and the reports will be resumed if events dictate. Dissolution of the task force and final official termination of the situation reports will be determined by future events. 25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Release Authority

[REDACTED]  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director for Production

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FILE DESIGNATION

CONCURRENCES

C-0099/VDIN /Mr. [ ] [ ] /1 Jun 76

TO: Mr. [ ]  
 Chief, Production Assessment and  
 Improvement Division  
 Intelligence Community Staff  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D.C. 20505

SUBJECT: National Sitrep Procedures

Reference: Your note on this subject dated 24 May 1976

1. [ ] I have reviewed the subject procedures. They are  
 satisfactory from the DIA standpoint.

2. [ ] I also circulated the procedures to J-3 for their  
 comment. Rear Admiral Schoultz, Acting Director for  
 Operations replied that, while he sees considerable merit  
 in a single national intelligence report during crisis  
 periods, including operational data in it raises another  
 problem, i.e., the statutory responsibility of the SecDef  
 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide direct and  
 unfiltered advice to the President on military operations.  
 Consequently J-3's support to the National Sitrep will be  
 subject to the caveat that their participation must in no  
 way jeopardize their role as principal military advisers  
 to the President. In practice, this would probably mean  
 that the National Sitrep Task Force would be provided only  
 standard operational information generated in the conduct  
 of the crisis operation.

3. [ ] Based on an informal inquiry we made to the legal  
 counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, we would  
 probably have to obtain the agreement of each of the Chiefs  
 if JCS involvement in the National Sitrep is to be  
 materially larger than that described above.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

SIGNED

[ ]  
 Major General, USAF  
 Interim Vice Director  
 for Production

Coord cy  
 VDP cy  
 DIN cy

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RETURN FOR FILING TO:

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